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a b s t r a c t
The main objective of this paper is to explore the possible common 
grounds, divergences and complementarities between the Veblenian’s 
approach on the Theory of Business Enterprise followed by Institutional 
economists, and the modern Post Keynesian Micro theory on Business 
enterprise. Due to the dispersion and lack of systematization of 
Institutional Economics regarding this body of theory, compared with 
the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, the main efforts of this paper 
will be dedicated to a short survey of the Institutional approach.  In the 
second section of the paper  I review the basic ideas presented in Veblen’s 
main contributions on this area regarding business enterprises (industrial 
process, main principles,   role of credit, ownership structure, the legal 
framework, the price behavior and the cultural incidences). Then, I make 
a comparison with the main theoretical results that modern postkeynesian 
vision has developed regarding structure of production, costing, pricing, 
investment, and competition and market governance . I claim that even 
though there are commonalities and some minor divergences between 
the two approaches, complementarities among them are more relevant, 
although the main areas of research have been somewhat different.  I 
end with some conclusions that underline possible areas of cooperation 
between these two schools of economic thought within the heterodox 
paradigm.
key words: Theory of the Firm, Postkeynesian Economics, Institutional 
Economics.
jel clasification: B5, D2, M2
r e s u m e n
El  principal objetivo de este ensayo es explorar los puntos de convergencia, 
divergencias y complementariedades, entre el enfoque de Veblen sobre 
la teoría de la firma seguida por los Economistas Institucionalistas, y la  
teoría moderna Postkeynesiana de la firma.  Debido a la dispersión y 
falta de sistematización de la teoría institucionalista Original de la firma 
comparada con la teoría Postkeynesiana, los mayores esfuerzos del ensayo  
se dedican a hacer una revisión de los principales  aportes de la teoría 
del institucionalismo original a   la teoría de la firma. En la segunda 
sección se  hace un recorrido de los principales aportes de Thorstein 
Veblen a la teoría de la empresa de negocios cubriendo aspectos como el 
proceso industrial, el papel del crédito,  la estructura de la propiedad,  la 
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estructura jurídica, las reglas de fijación de precios y el ambiente cultural 
que la afecta. Luego se establece una comparación con la moderna teoría 
postkeynesiana de la firma en relación a la estructura de la producción, 
costos, precios, inversión, competencia y gobernanza del mercado. 
Sostengo que aunque hay coincidencias y algunas menores divergencias 
entre los dos enfoques, las complementariedades son  más relevantes, 
aunque las áreas de investigación han sido distintas. Al final se presentan 
conclusiones y posibles líneas  de cooperación entre las  dos escuelas de 
pensamiento del paradigma heterodoxo. 
palabras claves: Teoría de la Firma, Economía Postkeynesiana, Economía 
Institucional.
clasificación jel: B5, D2, M2
IntroductIon
It is clear that just criticizing the main assumptions of Neoclassical 
Economics cannot develop Heterodox Economics.  It has been 
recognized, from a heterodox perspective, that there is an urgent 
need of developing a coherent and consistent alternative theoretical 
framework in the basic fields of Micro and Macroeconomics in order 
to have a common ground from which we can develop analytical 
tools to be applied in other areas of economic theory. 
However, we also know the huge diversity that exists within 
Heterodox Economics, going from Marxian approaches to 
Postkeynesian, Neoricardians, Feminists and Institutionalist 
economics. This extreme diversity posits some doubts regarding 
the issue of defining something as “heterodox “ economics, due to 
the excessive plurality among these unorthodox, and sometimes 
conflicting views on Economics.  To some young economists this 
‘plurality’ within Heterodox Economics sometimes could be 
discouraging and problematic.
revista economía del caribe nº2 (2008) págs. 1-30[4]
post-keynesian micro theory on business enterprise and 
the veblenian’s  approach:  are there commonalities?
However, I claim, following Sheila Dow (2000), that during the 
last 20 years, Orthodox economics has been also affected by this 
phenomenon of fragmentation. An example of this is the appearance 
of new areas such as Game theory and Experimental Economics and 
other approaches that in a strict sense do not contribute much to 
the development of the General Equilibrium Theory. Moreover, the 
relevance of problems of incomplete and asymmetric information 
among economic agents, have weaken the notion of a unique 
equilibrium, and driven the analysis to the cumbersome area of 
multiple equilibrium (Dow,  p. 159).
If we believe that one of the main characteristics of all strands of 
Heterodox Economics is to see society and the economy as an open 
system, based on the important criteria that a closed mathematical 
formalization is not necessary for the development of it, then we 
can assess this pluralism and diversity of Heterodox economics as 
a virtue and a possibility of development, and not as a defect. Of 
course, this idea does not mean it is not important for us to develop 
economic models as our experience in system dynamics models, 
agent-based modeling and other approaches show.
Hence, to discover commonalities, differences and 
complementarities among the different approaches within 
Heterodox Economics remains a valid task. Of course, pluralism 
cannot mean that anything goes on, but a careful analysis of the main 
theories and the critique of them are required. This is the only way 
that will enable us to define carefully common grounds, differences, 
and possibilities of cooperative work, regarding the development 
of theory among the different approaches.
This paper follows this perspective regarding the theory of 
Business enterprise. Neoclassical Micro Theory today is taught as 
“the” only Micro Theory all over the world. However, heterodox 
economists have developed other approaches. By the same token, 
it is also necessary to define the real common grounds between 
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Heterodox Economics, and its differences and possibilities of 
convergence among different schools of heterodox economic 
thought. This is the only way to construct a valid alternative to 
Neoclassical Economics, and to show progress in developing a 
serious alternative paradigm (Dow, 2000, p. 169). 
The main objective of this paper is to explore the possible 
common grounds, divergences and complementarities between the 
Veblenian’s approach on the Theory of Business Enterprise followed 
by Institutional economists, and the modern Post Keynesian Micro 
theory on Business enterprise. Due to the dispersion and lack of 
systematization of Institutional Economics regarding this body of 
theory, compared with the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, the 
main efforts of this paper will be dedicated to a short survey of the 
Institutional approach.  It must  be recognized however  that  during 
the last ten years a good number of papers and books have been 
aimed to this cross over between IE and the PK theory of business 
enterprise.
In the second section I review the basic ideas presented in Veblen’s 
main contributions on this area regarding business enterprises 
(industrial process, main principles,   role of credit, ownership 
structure, the legal framework, the price behavior and the cultural 
incidences).
Later, I continue with an account of the last contributions by 
Institutional economists like Munkir, Knoedler, Dugger and others. 
New institutional economists’ approach will not be included 
because I consider them close to the neoclassical paradigm1. 
Then, I make a comparison with the main theoretical results that 
modern postkeynesian vision has developed regarding structure of 
production, costing, pricing, investment, competition and market 
1  To avoid any confusion, I consider Instituionalist Economists those who follow 
the Veblen-Commons-Ayres-Mitchell’s tradition. The New Institutionalists 
Economists are gathered around the Coase- North- Williamson’s strand.
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governance (Eichner, Lee and others). I claim that even though 
there are commonalities and some minor divergences between 
the two approaches, complementarities among them are more 
relevant, although the main areas of research have been somewhat 
different.  I end with some conclusions that underline possible areas 
of cooperation between these two schools of economic thought 
within the heterodox paradigm.
Veblen’s approach on the theory of 
busIness enterprIse
Thorstein Veblen’s main contributions to the institutionalist theory 
of Business enterprise were outlined during the first three decades of 
the 20th century with The Theory of Business Enterprise (Veblen, 1904) 
and Absentee ownership: the case of America (Veblen,1967)2.  These two 
works were written during a process of intense transformation of 
American capitalism where the modern corporation as we know 
it today, became the dominant organizational structure of business 
enterprise in America. For Veblen, the business enterprise was 
now “…the directing force which animates the modern industrial 
system…”(1904, p. 1) based on what he called the machine process. 
The machine industries were in a dominant position, setting the 
pace for the rest of the economy (1904, p. 2). This machine process 
led to a process of standardization, where the industrial unit was  “a 
given industrial plant” (1904, p. 16).
This new technological and economic development required 
a new business organization and new “business methods” that 
generated a new culture embedded in the business enterprise. 
Using his famous dichotomy regarding “industrial” and “pecuniary” 
transactions, Veblen argued that “the adjustments of industry take 
place through the mediation of pecuniary transactions, and these 
2  Absentee and Ownership was first published in 1923 by B.W.Huebusch, Inc.
revista economía del caribe nº2 (2008) págs. 1-30 [7]
Jairo Parada Corrales
transactions take place at the hands of business men and are carried 
on by them for business ends, not for industrial ends…in the 
narrower meaning of the phrase” (p. 27). Now,  “the business man 
aims to gain control of a given block of industrial equipment …as a 
basis for further transactions out of which gain is expected” (p. 31). 
Based on the machine process, the new business enterprise implied 
the formation of larger industrial consolidations, leaving behind any 
illusion about competitive markets, so pondered by the orthodox 
economic analysis. Thus, Veblen was depicting the transformation 
of American capitalism that indeed was very concentrated since its 
own beginnings during the second half of the 19th century.
Veblen pointed out the main facts of this new process, based on 
economies of scale and business savings, not only in the production 
costs but also in the management and marketing costs (46). 
Unnecessary business transactions were eliminated, where less large 
firms were eliminated or absorbed. In Veblen’s words, “…It is a 
casting out of business men by the chief of business men” (p. 49).
The aim of the businessman is not the naïve short run 
maximization of profits given some resources of capital and labor. 
His work is pointed to the “acquisition of gain through taking 
advantages of those conjunctures of business that arise out of the 
concatenation of processes in the industrial system” (p. 49). This 
implied a strategic vision for the business enterprise, more oriented 
to its survival and growth, through the use of power and control 
within the market system. The pricing behavior of these enterprises 
would not follow, according to Veblen, any equilibrium between 
supply and demand, nor an equalizing principle between marginal 
revenue and marginal costs.  Business enterprises, recalling the 
experience of American railroads, will charge “what the traffic will 
bear” (p. 54).
The institution of ownership was in the center of Veblenian’s 
analysis of the business enterprise; it was its “spiritual ground” (p. 66). 
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This ownership was translated in terms of money, where investments 
were made on the basis of being able to generate profits (p. 85). 
Value of plants and processes were assessed on the basis of profit-
yielding capacity. Here, the use of credit becomes an important tool 
to enable the business enterprise to grow and expand through the 
control of markets. Thus, Veblen started the institutionalist tradition 
to concentrate the analysis on the problems of control, management 
and stock ownership, as the main and new characteristic of the 
corporation. Compared with previous periods, loans were still 
important for day-to-day operations of the corporation. In the 
same direction, issuance of bonds and other notes were also used. 
To Veblen, these loans had “a pecuniary (business) existence, not a 
material (industrial) one…” (p. 103). Depending on the business 
cycle, this debt structure would only redistribute the ownership 
of the business enterprise in favor of the claimants and holders of 
these titles (p. 105).
But a new structure of ownership was generated now by means 
of a new form of credit, based on the stock share, defined by Veblen 
as “a transfer of a given property from the hands of an owner who 
resigns discretion in its control to a board of directors who assume 
the management of it” (p. 114). This new corporate finance was 
based on the capitalized good will of the firm, responding to a 
present value of a future stream of profits, without a necessary 
representation on the real value of assets embedded in the industrial 
process. Now, the main concern of the captains of industry was not 
industrial business (‘industrial’ in the Veblenian sense) but pecuniary 
business, and ‘capital’ was not only related to the value of means 
of production any more but with the “capitalized putative earning-
capacity” (p. 131).  Hence, the “nucleolus of the capitalization is not 
the cost of the plant, but the concern’s good-will...” (p. 138).
The good-will of the business enterprise is crucial for its financing. 
Veblen carefully depicts this good-will as composed by customary 
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business relations, reputation for upright dealing, franchises and 
privileges, trade marks, brands, patents and copyrights and exclusive 
use of process.  These are going to be “immaterial goods covered by 
the common stock” (p. 145). Thus, for Veblen, the corporation was 
now the typical characteristic form of business organization for the 
management of the industry, based on a method of capitalization that 
implied a separation between the management and the ownership 
of the industrial assets. The ‘credit economy’ as Veblen characterized 
this new period, made it possible (p. 146)3.
This separation between ownership and management is going 
to be one of the main areas of interest among post-Veblenian 
economists. Veblen stated, “the interests of the managers of a modern 
corporation need not coincide with the permanent interest of the 
corporation as a going concern…” (p. 157)4.  To Veblen, the interest 
of the community is to get the best and large possible output of goods 
and services.  The interest of the corporation as a going concern 
is to maintain its efficiency and to give the best output and prices. 
However, the interests of the managers are oriented to “… enable 
them to buy the enterprise or to sell it out as expeditiously and 
advantageously as may be...” (p. 157). In other words, pecuniary 
interests of the managers are above the ‘industrial’ interests of 
society and the corporation itself as a going concern.  In Veblen’s 
words, “under this system of corporation finance the affairs of the 
corporation are in good part managed for tactical ends which are 
of interest to the manager rather than to the corporation as a going 
concern…” (p. 162).
3 Veblen defined the feudal system as  a  “goods”  economy, the period of appe a rance of 
capitalism as a “money” economy, and the phase of the modern business enterprise 
as a “credit” economy. Thus, he would coincide with modern post Keynesians who 
give a decisive role to credit in a modern monetary economy (Veblen, 1904, 137).
4  As I will show later, this statement is exactly the opposite of Eichner’s (1976).
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Veblen’s vision on modern business enterprise allowed him to 
propose a theory of business cycles on a pure “micro” perspective5. 
Veblen claimed that the growth of business enterprise rests on the 
modern industrial technology. But the discipline generated by the 
machine process  “cuts away the spiritual foundations of business 
enterprise; it is incompatible with its continued growth…In their 
struggle against the cultural effects of the machine process…business 
principles cannot win in the long run…” (p. 375). Clearly, Veblen 
underestimated the huge possibilities that the evolving business 
enterprise was going to have during the 20th century through its 
expansion and consolidation, not only within the US economy but 
also around the entire globe.
By the time Veblen published Absentee and Ownership the 
transformations of American capitalism were already under way, 
confirming all the previous insights in its previous work on the 
business enterprise. For this reason, Veblen displayed a careful 
analysis of this new phenomenon, which separated ownership from 
management in the modern business enterprise. For Veblen, “the 
corporation is a business concern, not an industrial unit…it is an 
incorporation of absentee ownership, wholly and obviously…the 
corporation’s control and direction of industry is a financial 
control…” (Veblen, 1967, p. 83).
5 In several footnotes (Veblen, 1904, p. 203) he suggests a margin of gains of 
output as the difference between the sales price of the firm and the expenses 
of production of output. Investments were made with a view of pecuniary 
gains(186). Technology, through the machine process, generated an industrial 
system  that configured a “system of interstitial relations” based also on the 
extension of the credit system. Thus, Veblen sees business cycles as a result of 
excessive “business traffic” caused for pecuniary be ha vior of management and 
not  as a phenomenon of the material pro cess of production and consumption 
(185, footnote 1), criticizing the explanations given in a Marxian perspective 
by Tugan-Baranowsky.
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The new structure of ownership in command of the modern 
business enterprise converted it into a pecuniary institution and not 
an industrial one: “its corporate activities are not in the nature of 
workmanship but on salesmanship” (p. 83).  The modern business 
enterprise, Veblen asserts, is “pecuniary institution, not an industrial 
appliance…it is a means of making money, not of making goods…” 
(p. 85).
According to Veblen, the behavior of this business enterprise is 
focused on obtaining “…a large and secure net gain, to acquire title, 
to ‘make money’…” (p. 212). In doing so, the business enterprise is 
going to cut employment and output in order to get “an enhanced 
rate of earnings for the time being…and advancing its price 
schedule” (p. 214). Here, Veblen is depicting the usual behavior 
of a monopolist, but prices are not a result of any equalization 
of marginal costs and revenues but are “advanced” according to a 
strategic behavior of the corporation lured by its pecuniary interests. 
Clearly, a notion of “managed” prices was suggested here.
Veblen’s analysis underlines the financial structure behind the 
modern corporation. He carefully depicts all the financial innovations 
during his times, innovations that allow the financing of the business 
enterprise based on the difference between the value of the goodwill 
of the corporation and the real value of the means of production 
incorporated in it. Extending this vision to the overall society, that 
will enable us today to easily understand the past crisis of the dot-
com companies; Veblen states that “the total wealth of the country 
counted as assets, funded capital values, is very appreciably larger 
than the same total when counted as itemized material wealth in 
hand…” Thus, one finds a paradox in the modern capitalist society: 
“the ordinary net earnings of business must exceed the ordinary net 
product of industry from which alone these net earnings are to be 
drawn…business management is businesslike and capable only in 
so far as it gets something for nothing…” (Footnote 11, p. 222). 
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This brilliant assertion reveals the permanent instability and fragility 
of the financial system over which the modern corporation rests 
still today6. The current sub-prime loan markets melt down is just 
another corroboration of the same situation.
Similarly to modern Postkeynesian analysis, Veblen had a 
structural vision of the industrial sector although ordered in a way 
different from the traditional input-output tables.  For Veblen, the 
primary or key sector were those in control of the main inputs 
for the mechanical industries such as power, transportation, fuel 
and structural materials (steel for example). The secondary sector 
was the manufacturing industries and the third sector was the 
agricultural one (p. 233).  He saw these three sectors overlapped, 
interlocked and blended (p. 234), but all of them were dominated 
by the mechanical industry (p. 235), based on the technology of 
physics and chemistry.
In sum, Veblen’s vision on the modern business enterprise gave 
powerful insights on the behavior of modern corporations regarding 
output and pricing, financing, capital structure, absentee ownership, 
pecuniary management and structural links among them and 
within sectors. His theory of the business firm is basically a theory 
of the firm in a monetary economy. Also, he carefully showed the 
connections between the microanalysis of the corporation and the 
macro phenomena of business cycles and financial instability.  These 
were important foundations for the theoretical efforts of modern 
institutional economists.
6 The validity of Veblen’s analysis, appliedto financial markets and product inno 
vations during the 1980s can be seen in Raines, J. and Leathers, G (1992), 
where financial innovations attempted in vain to reduce financial instability 
through collusions and financial “reforms”.
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the post-VeblenIan’s VIew of busIness enterprIse
Immediately after Veblen, Institutional economists oriented their 
research to general issues regarding the evolution of the modern 
industrial society, the proposal of a “reasonable theory of value”, 
the analysis of transactions in a capitalist society and the careful 
description of the business cycle (Ayres, Commons and Mitchell). 
However, not much attention was devoted to the specific study of 
the business enterprise in the way Veblen did.  The main findings 
during the 30s came from independent researchers who challenged 
sometimes the traditional vision of orthodox economics on the 
business enterprise7.
Berle and Means, in the Modern Corporation and private property 
(1968), published in 1932, made more evident the new basic trends 
of American capitalism already described by Veblen. For Berle and 
Means, those trends were the concentration of economic power, the 
greater dispersion of stock ownership and the problem of separation 
of ownership and control.  
According to Berle, there was a “passive” private property that 
was instituted by the growing corporate business. (p. XIX). They 
asserted that the nature of capital had changed, not composed 
of tangible goods “…but of organizations built in the past and 
available to function in the future” (p. 45). The invisible hand of 
market competition was being replaced by the “ultimate control of 
a handful of individuals” (p. 46). The ownership has now changed. 
It is passive and it is formed by a piece of paper that represents 
some rights over expected profits, but without any physical control 
over the instruments of production (p. 64). In that sense, the 
7 The analysis that follows starts with  a brief summary of the main results that 
A. Berle, G. Means and  A. Chandler brought to the analysis of the business 
enterprise, from which post-Veblenian Institutional Economists derived  new 
approaches during the 70s and the 80s. Strictly speaking,  Berle, Means and 
Chandler were not institutional economists as  I define them in this paper. 
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door was opened to conflicts and agency problems. In Berle and 
Means’s words, “we are dealing not only with distinct but often with 
opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control of the other 
– a control which tends to move further and further away from 
ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management 
itself, a management capable of perpetuating its own position” 
(116). This clearly raised the important question, for the modern 
institutionalist economists, about the interests of those who run 
and control the business enterprise and the interests of the owners 
represented by the stockholders. 
During the following decades, Means, in The Corporate Revolution 
in America   (Means,1962) presented more empirical evidence on the 
basic trends of the American capitalism,  and challenged strongly 
the naïve analysis of Neoclassical economics.  Another important 
matter was his analysis on the administrative character of the 
market, the indeterminacy of cost for business firms, the duality 
of the process of saving and the questioning of the maximization 
of profits as a motivating force of the modern corporation (p. 16). 
Here, Means proposed his well known theory of “administered 
prices” and “market prices” that   have become an important part 
of the modern heterodox theory of the firm, with important 
implications for a heterodox macroeconomics.  Today, Postkeynesian 
and Institutional economists need to reassess this theory, critically 
as Lee and Downward (1999) proposed. 
Means insisted also on the duality of ownership and control, 
asserting that “the owners supply the capital, but management 
controls the enterprise and determines its efficiency” (p. 160).  The 
pricing behavior of the corporation was determined by “an optimum 
balance between a higher or lower rate of return and a greater or 
less risk of new competition...” (p. 162).
In sum, as an independent researcher, Means’ analysis contributed 
in great extent to the development of the post-Veblenian Institutional 
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economics and the post-Keynesian Micro and Macroeconomics. 
(Lee and Samuels, 1992, p. xxxx). It is hard to know to what 
ex tent Veblen “impregnated” Mean’s ideas. I could not find any 
bibliographical reference in Means regarding Veblen’s works.
Another independent researcher, Alfred Chandler developed 
important insights on the modern corporation.  Chandler considered 
that Schumpeter’s individual entrepreneur is replaced now “by 
a collective entity, institutionalized among teams of managers 
operating within structures they themselves designed..”. (McCraw, 
1988, p. 9).  In  Chandler’s view, the overall strategy of business 
firms was defined  “ as the determination of basic long-term goals 
and objectives” (Chandler 1988a, p. 174). The structure of the firm 
is viewed as “a design of organization through which the enterprise 
is administered, “ where structures follow strategy” (p.174-176). 
Firm’s operations required, according to Chandler, a managerial 
hierarchy that allows an administrative coordination. This hierarchy 
is going to remain as a source of permanence and power, and it will 
foster firm’s growth, where long term stability is preferred over 
short run maximizing profit behavior. (Chandler 1988b, p. 396). 
Based on the works of Berle, Means and Chandler, post-Veblenian 
Institutional Economists developed further ideas regarding the 
functioning of business enterprises during the 70s and the 80s, 
even though at the beginning of the 70s, one does not find many 
references on institutional works on the Micro Theory of Business 
enterprises.
R.D. Peterson (1979) discussed about Chamberlin’s Monopolistic 
Competition underlying the theoretical influence of Thorstein 
Veblen on Chamberlin’s work (p. 670). He also points out how 
many Institutional economists at the time Chamberlin’s work was 
published, reacted favorably to it.  Peterson claims that Chamberlin’s 
work helped to undermine the neoclassical notion of equilibrium, 
showing the role of institutions and market structures behind 
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price determination. However, Peterson ends up recognizing that 
Chamberlin was basically a neoclassical economist trying to improve 
orthodox theory with institutional elements (p. 680). Also, he 
sees the mixing of institutional elements with neoclassical theory 
as something positive. The issue, in my opinion, just reveals the 
weakness existing at that time among Institutionalist economists, 
of a complete and developed Micro institutional theory of the 
firm, inasmuch as Chamberlin’s theory remains faithful to the basic 
assumptions of neoclassical theory8. 
A real development in institutional economics came with the 
works of John R. Munkirs, an economist, in his own words, “rooted 
in America’s institutionalism”(Munkirs, 1985, p.ix).  Building on 
Berle’s ideas about corporations as “quasipolitical institutions”, 
Munkirs up-dated institutionalist views on American capitalism, 
seeing corporations as an structured totality of technology, mass 
production, distribution and corporate concentration of power 
(p. 42).
The notion of Centralized Private Sector Planning (CPSP) is 
crucial in Munkirs’ analysis. In his own words, the CPSP “may 
be viewed as a process whereby the production and distribution 
activities of the economy’s key corporations and industries are 
organized and coordinated so as to bind these corporations and 
industries together into a functionally integrated production and 
distribution system” (p. 60). 
There are three planning instruments or mechanisms that put 
these corporations together: 1) corporate stock; 2) the Board of 
Directors; 3) The corporate debt. The corporate stock reflects all the 
problems of ownership and control, depicted previously by Veblen, 
and Berle and Means. Munkirs explains in detail all the different 
8 Here I am not suggesting that such a theory exists today. As I will show later, 
I am more inclined to believe in the need of constructing a heterodox theory 
of the firm conflating Postkeynesian and Institutionalist approaches.
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systems of voting, including the cumulative voting and proxy voting 
systems. He discovers that using these voting systems, and due to 
the dispersion of ownership among stockholders, a 5%-10% of 
the common stocks would be enough to control a corporation. 
Hence, the Central Planning Core (CPC), formed by the main 
banks, insurance companies and the most important corporations, 
is able to control a strategic share of the stocks of different 
corporations, generating “ a very explicit set of interdependent 
structural relationships” (p. 77). These interconnections are based 
on technological and pecuniary interdependences.
The Board of Directors, from a pragmatic perspective, becomes, 
according to Munkirs, “a self-electing and /or self-perpetuating 
dynasty…” (p. 80). A Board is formed by insiders (usually corporative 
officers who deal with the day-to-day issues of the firm) and  outsiders 
(business executives form other corporations). The Board itself, 
operates as a functional planning tool, with intra and interlocking 
ties to other corporations, and also with indirect directorship 
interlocks9.
The corporate debt becomes also a powerful planning instrument 
for the CPC through several mechanisms such as equity capital 
(stocks), debt capital (bonds), notes, bond certificates, bond 
indentures and trust agreements.  Through the debt mechanisms, 
the CPC is able to act as a major creditor to the corporation, having 
access to the key strategic documents of the business enterprise10.
Thus, using these three instruments, the CPC is able to allocate 
capital between and among several industries, undermining the 
9 In the indirect directorship interlocks, a set of board directors, coming from 
two different corporations, meet together in a third board of a corporation in 
which they are outsiders.
10 Usually, creditors as Trust banks, have a seat on the Board, and are able prac-
tically to veto any decision of the corporation that does not agree with their 
interests.
revista economía del caribe nº2 (2008) págs. 1-30[18]
post-keynesian micro theory on business enterprise and 
the veblenian’s  approach:  are there commonalities?
power of regulatory commissions. Also, the use of joint-ventures 
allows a major degree of consultation, planning and coordination 
(p. 145). The evolution of the technological industrial process 
helps to concentrate administrative control over the key industries, 
generating a centralized management process that practically 
replaces the traditional market system. The CPC is able to do so in 
such a way, that society as a whole, does not perceive it as a coercive 
force (p. 181).
This idea of power and control permeates institutional view 
of the industrial system. In another work, Munkirs and Sturgeon 
(1985) propose to replace the concept of oligopolistic competition 
by the more realistic concept of oligopolistic cooperation, supported 
by the structural interdependences among firms. For Knoedler 
(1990), for example, the antitrust legislation of the beginning of 
the century played a minor role in the expansions and mergers 
that occurred during that period, as in the cases of Dupont, 
General Electric and ATT. For these companies, the visible hand of 
management –motivated by innovation and non-price competition–, 
accompanied by large scale advantages, were decisive (403).  As 
Munkirs and Koedler explain, “one basic tenet of institutional 
economics is the existence and exercise of power and coercion in 
the community’s economic decision making” (Munkirs and Koedler, 
1987, p.1679).
This approach brings on different notions of market power, for 
regulated and non-regulated industries, and it points out the idea 
of autarkical power for the CPSP (1683). The behavior of firms in 
the “planned” sector is different: while non-planned sector firms 
seek survival and profits, planned sector firm leaders decide on the 
industry’s optimal size, the number of participants, and system-wide 
profits and liquidity as a whole. The needs of the individual firms 
are not important. Non-planned firms sell stocks and  acquire debts 
to raise financial resources. Within the CPSP, stocks and debts are 
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traded to reorganize industries, to allocate financial resources among 
firms, and to punish or reward the behavior of individual units. 
Non-planned firms are more national-based, CPSP firms operate 
from a global perspective, based on the needs of global markets 
mixed with political factors (p. 1686).
A power-oriented vision of the economy offers a particular vision 
of the structures of the industrial system. Munkirs and Knoedler 
find  the following elements in this structure: 1) contractual satellite 
industries/firms (auto dealerships, gasoline stations, recreational 
vehicles, grocery stores, drugstores, etc)which do not  have any 
control on output, quality or prices of the products they sell; 2) non-
contractual satellite /industries/firms (sellers at the wholesale and 
retail level) subjected through technological imperatives; 3) CPSP 
industries which control 55-60% of the output, using administered 
prices.  (1688-89).  At the end, this whole structure, coordinated by 
the CPC, is analyzed under the Veblenian dilemma, being inefficient 
or “morally evil” as long as it plans “primarily according to their self 
interest” (1703). In other words, the planning process does not solve 
the contradiction between the industrial interests of society and the 
pecuniary interests of the CPC.
Munkir’s views  are very illustrative of the realities of the modern 
corporate system and undoubtedly, his work is an important piece 
in understanding the business world today. Despite this, I wonder 
to what extent Munkirs exaggerated the degree of coordination 
among the so-called CPC. This is a question difficult to answer 
without sufficient empirical evidence that, by the way, is very hard to 
recollect. One wonders to what extent this social elite group within 
the CPC is really able to coordinate so much, taking into account 
that each sector of this group can have their own agenda.
William Dugger studied in detail the dynamics within the 
corporate enterprise as an expression of corporate power. He 
starts paying attention to the study of corporate bureaucracy 
revista economía del caribe nº2 (2008) págs. 1-30[20]
post-keynesian micro theory on business enterprise and 
the veblenian’s  approach:  are there commonalities?
embedded in a pecuniary culture, despite its technocratic orientation 
(Dugger,1980). The organization evolution of the business 
enterprise has been characterized by shifts towards decentralization 
and diversification. However, Dugger claims that “US enterprises 
are becoming more top-heavy, even though some decentralization 
and de-diversification are taking place” (Dugger, 1985b). The recent 
mergers and acquisitions during the 90s are just another sample of 
the same process.
Dugger (1985a) criticizes the traditional measures of concen-
tration ratios for the manufacturing sector, observing that these ratios 
miss the aggregate concentration and conglomerate concentration. 
Reviewing these measures, he finds new sources of powers such as 
reciprocal dealings, cross-subsidizing and mutual forbearance.
In one of his most developed works, Dugger (1988) examines 
the corporate power in detail, enriching the institutionalist approach 
on this topic. He claims that the higher concentration ratios of 
the modern corporation imply not only new structures but also 
a cultural adjustment (80). After recognizing the organizational 
change from the U-form toward the M-form of the organizational 
structure of corporations, he asserts that a new technology has 
been developed. 
This new technology is not related with the production of 
goods and services. It is referred to the organization and control 
of people. The technological revolution is basically in organization 
and information. That is how the business enterprise overcomes the 
limitations in size. Now, in Dugger’s words, “since corporations can 
live forever, they can theoretically grow forever as well…” (p. 85).
Following the product-portfolio approach, the new conglomerate 
classifies its firms as cash cows, stars, dogs and cats (p. 87). The 
derived strategy would be to sell off the dogs (small market share of 
declining industries), invest in cows (subsidiaries with a large market 
share of stable or declining industries) and stars (largest market 
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shares in growing industries). Cows will be milked to buy the rising 
stars. From this scenario, shareholders do not play a major role, they 
are expression of the Veblenian absentee ownership (p. 89).
Strategy of the business enterprise must follow the interests of 
the CEO and the controlling group of share holders. But here, human 
agency intervenes through the behavior of management at different 
levels. The business enterprise must develop a culture to control 
the managerial levels. Based on Veblen, Dugger identifies four 
invaluation processes to align the behavior of management with the 
objectives of the corporate control: contamination, subordination, 
emulation and mystification (pp. 92-99)11. Dugger  also pinpoints the 
misery of the managerial class, saying that “..is a dependent class, a 
kept class. It possesses no power, no status, and no substantial wealth 
of its own. Even its culture is not of its own making” (p.102). This 
managerial class, following Dugger, still controls daily operations 
of the firm and make some important decisions, but it is restricted 
by the conglomerate institutional framework, defined by “a system 
of institutionalized greed” (p. 106).
Finally, the last contributions of institutionalist economists have 
been oriented to discuss the transaction cost theories of business 
enterprises developed by New Institutionalist Economists, especially 
those proposed by Oliver  Williamson. It is not relevant for the 
purpose of this paper to tackle this debate here, but it will suffice to 
say that the theory of the firm developed by Veblen, Munkirs, Dugger 
and others, clearly follow a historically grounded perspective 
and not a rational choice approach no matter how “bounded” this 
rationality could be as in the case of the NIE economists12.
11 We do not have room here to explain carefully each process, but it is a 
good example of an institutional analysis of the corporate behavior and the 
strategies of control of people. 
12 See Knoedler (1995) and  Pitelis (1998).
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postkeynesIan and InstItutIonalIst theorIes of 
the fIrm: commonalItIes or complementarItIes
Postkeynesian Theory of the firm has a great advantage over 
Institutional Economics, which is that it has been able to develop 
a consistent and formal framework of the theory of the firm13.
This effort has allowed them to construct the Micro foundations 
of Postkey nesian Macro analysis. In the case of Institutional Eco-
nomics the task has been less systematic, somewhat disperse, in 
such a way that it cannot be said that we have an Institutional Micro 
and Macroeconomics. Institutional Economists have devoted their 
energies to both areas, some of them insisting in “micro” issues, 
and the majority of them working on “macro” topics. Despite 
this, regarding the theory of the firm, both bodies of knowledge 
have built their theories upon the powerful ideas of Berle, Means 
and Chandler, trying to be faithful to their own basic theoretical 
principles.
Regarding the nature of business enterprise, both approaches 
see it not only as a technological unit of production, but also as 
a social unit, embedded in a social structure, and subjected to 
cultural, legal and social constraints.  The basic unit of analysis is 
the business enterprise, considered as an entity characterized by an 
organizational complexity, where human agency plays a role. In this 
sense, both Micro approaches part company with the Neoclassical 
isolated firm with a profit maximizing behavior. However, Lee 
(2001) has tried to develop a critical realist framework, looking 
not only at structures, but also searching for causal mechanisms 
and trends.  
Although in Munkirs (1985) one finds “planning instruments” 
or mechanisms, it is obvious that institutionalist economists do not 
13 See for example Woods (1975),  Eichner (1976), Ch.3 in  Lavoie (1992), Lee 
(1998) and Lee (2001).
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use the critical realism’s tools explicitly. In fact, there could be 
some divide here regarding methodological grounds. While Lee 
(2001) claims his “grounded theory method” is based on the critical 
realism’s approach14, Institutional economists adopt Dewey’s prag-
matic inquiry, which is basically a pragmatic epistemology15.
Regarding prices, Postkeynesians have built an empirical theory 
of prices based on the doctrine of administered prices, normal 
cost prices, mark up prices and Lee’s approach on grounded 
price theory (Lee, 1998). Institutionalist School has accepted the 
doctrine of administered prices and criticized the marginal cost 
pricing of Neoclassical Theory (Fisher, 1991).  However, there is not 
a systematic Price theory in Institutionalist Economics, although 
they do not see always prices so disjointed with quantities as 
Postkeynesian Economists do. Once the technological and cere-
monial characteristics of goods are defined, then prices play a role 
on quantities. 
Postkeynesian Theory of Prices is basically an empirical one, 
without any reference whatsoever to any concept of value. 
Institutional Economics has developed an instrumental theory 
of value but not as a basis for a price theory but for a normative 
analysis of society. In fact, this instrumental theory of value is used 
in the analysis of the impact of business enterprises on society 
and in the definition of some policy designs to limit their negative 
effects on the ongoing industrial concerns of society as a whole.
Postkeynesian Theory of Business Enterprise has been able to 
develop a formal theoretical framework  explaining the structure 
of pro duction, costing and pricing (Eichner, 1976, and Lee, 2001) 
14 Some critical realist analysts do not consider “grounded theory method” 
as a method proper of  critical realism asserting that is pure empiricism 
(Ardebili, M. Class notes’ on critical realism. Fall, 2001. UMKC).
15   Critical realists have included institutionalist Economics as belonging to the 
Hermeneutic paradigm. I am at variance with this assertion.
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which is absent in Institutional Economics, excepting for some 
references by Veblen’s  about pricing  what the market can bear, 
or  some insights in Munkir about the strategic behavior of 
corporations. However, in this area, I claim that Institutionalist 
Economists have paid more attention to the financial aspects that 
concern the life of the business enterprise as a going concern.
Both theories have very weak developments about investment 
decisions by business enterprises, and the impacts of these decisions 
on employment.  But, regarding the analysis of market structures 
and governance within these structures, institutionalist economists 
are ahead of Postkeynesians.
One issue that in my opinion also could separate Postkeynesians 
and Institutionalists is the dynamics of ownership vs. control 
within the business enterprise. Some Post Keynesian  Economists 
follow Eichner’s vision , that  “the goals of the executive group are 
coextensive with those of the megacorp” (Eichner, 1976 p. 23). 
In  Munkir’s  and Dugger’s views, one finds a different scenario, 
based on the idea of the  central nucleus of control of the economy, 
where pecuniary interests are in command, and not only the long 
run survival of the corporation. Institutional analysis here, gives 
more role to human agency, pointing out the continuous struggle 
between management, the reduced group in control of the board 
and the common interests of the stockholders (Munkirs, 1985 and 
Dugger, 1988).
 Business history is full of examples of sell outs by members 
of the Boards driven by the pecuniary interests of CEO’s, inside 
members, or the strategic group that control the strategic decisions 
in the business enterprise. The case of the fall of  RJR Nabisco into 
the hands of RJ Reynolds in the 80s16, and the past  struggle between 
the Hewlett Packard family and other shareholders,  against  the 
16 See Burrough, B. and Helyaar, J. (1990). Barbarians at the gate. New York: 
Harper & Row.
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CEO of the company17 are just two of hundred of cases seen in the 
last two decades only.  In fact, the continuous increasing number 
of class action litigations regarding law suits from stockholders 
against corporation boards is staggering. During the period 1991-
1995, an average of 189 lawsuits per year was filed against many 
corporations.  An average of 223 cases has been presented during 
1996-200118.
Wray (2007, p. 617) recently recognized that regarding 
the theory of business enterprise, “Veblen’s version is in some 
important respects more complete, and still relevant for developing 
an understanding of modern business practice”. Wray states that 
Veblen was more pessimistic about the possibilities of capitalism 
of overcoming depression through unproductive consumption due 
to the fact that technological advances increase capacity faster than 
pecuniary earnings. Also, he points out that Veblen ties his theory 
of the business enterprise to the theory of the cycle, and links this 
to his theory of growing concentration of ownership.  Although 
“Keynes does address the distinction between ownership and 
control of the production process”, he “… is not wholly critical of 
the increasing corporatization of the economy” (p. 621-622). Also, 
Veblen was more emphatic in the role of “capitalization” instead of 
just speculation regarding the financial crisis that we have endured 
during recent years. 
To sum up, despite some divergences between Postkeynesians 
and Institutionalists regarding the theory of business enterprise, 
there are also some commonalities among them. However, I 
claim that the research issues developed by the two schools of 
thought are somewhat different. This fact does not impede that 
both approaches could be complementary each other.  Hence, the 
17 Fried, I and Kanellos, “ Hewlett family opposes Compaq deal”. CNET News.
com. Nov.6, 2001.
18  See  Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse -Nov. 21, 2001.
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possibility of a common work pointing to build a solid heterodox 
theory of the Business Enterprise is open. 
conclusIons
I have found more commonalities between the Postkeynesian 
Theory of the Business Enterprise and the Institutionalist approach 
despite some discrepancies that still remain. The way both theories 
see the corporation, its pricing policy and behavior, and the 
structure of markets and their governance, are practically the 
same. Institutionalist economists have analyzed the interlocking 
and intralockings among corporations deeper, and have developed 
more the research around the notion of corporate power.  
Also, Institutionalists have proposed some criteria, based on 
their theory of instrumental value, to devise a regulation policy 
over the continuous and growing power concentration in the US 
economy. Moreover, they have generated important insights on the 
culture of corporations and the way power is reproduced within 
them.
However, Post Keynesians have been able to formalize the 
theory much better, expressing it in models that can be used as 
powerful tools in the development of the theory. Institutionalist 
economists can clearly incorporate these theoretical devices in 
their analysis.
If Orthodox economics have become more diverse during the 
last decade, I do not see any reason why one cannot accept a valid 
diversity in Heterodox Economics, where defining commonalities 
and discrepancies allow us to build better approaches. In the case of 
the theory of the firm, the task is easier as long as complementarities 
are greater compared with discrepancies.
Undoubtedly, many paradigmatic issues still remain to be 
clarified between the two schools of thought. One of them, is 
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the need to define a philosophical and social ontology that will 
help to make clear their approaches from the epistemological 
and methodological standpoints. This exercise would also help to 
define limits with other currents of Heterodox Economics such as 
Radical Political Economics. As we can see, the research agenda 
looks very broad and fruitful. 
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